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I. INTRODUCTION
A three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently caused an
uproar in the federal criminal justice system when it decided that a federal bribery
statute,' enacted in 1962, prohibited prosecutors from offering leniency to
suspected criminals in exchange for testimony against fellow accomplices.' The
unanimous opinion in Singleton v. United States (hereinafter Singleton 1) shocked
law enforcement officials and gave criminal defendants (and their attorneys) a
substantial, albeit short-lived, victory Shortly after the decision, numerous
prisoners and defendants petitioned courts, arguing that Singleton I invalidated
their convictions." The federal judiciary, however, was quick to condemn Singleton
I. Just nine days after the publication of decision, the Tenth Circuit, on its own
motion, granted a rehearing en banc and subsequently reversed the panel's decision
(hereinafter Singleton 11).6 At the time of this writing, at least eight other circuit
courts of appeals and numerous district courts have rejected Singleton r s holding.7
1. See Pub. L. No. 87-849, § 1(a), 76 Stat. 1119, 1120 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 201(h) (effective
Oct. 23, 1962) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1986)).
2. Singleton v. United States, 144 F.3d 1343, 1348 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d
1297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2371 (1999). Professor Albert Aschuler of the University of
Chicago characterized the Singleton I opinion by stating, "[flt's a bombshell, it's nuclear, it's really a
big deal." Justice System Thrown Off Balance by Ruling, Omaha World-Herald, July 17, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 5512734. Another writer stated that Singleton I"caused earthquake-size shivers
through law enforcement." Gerald Walpin, The Tenth Circuit's "Singleton" Decision Wrong and
Uniformly Rejected, 220 N.Y. LJ. 2 (Oct. 29, 1998). The Justice Department stated that Singleton I
had "caused chaos in district courts and U.S. Attorney's Offices in [the Tenth Circuit] ... and
significant disruption throughout the rest of the country." William Glaberson, Leniency Ruling Jolts
U.S. Legal Procedures, The Journal Record (Oklahoma City), Nov. 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL
11961432.
3. See, e.g., Mike Fimea, Plea Bargain in Air in 10th, Arizona Business Gazette, Nov. 5,1998,
available in 1998 WL 7738146; Patricia Nealon, Mass. Lawyers Await Effects of Colo. Ruling, The
Boston Globe, July 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9145598.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687,688 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1784
(1999) (noting that "defendants throughout the nation" had argued for other courts to adopt Singleton
/); United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (11 th Cir. 1999), petitionfor cert. filed, (July 6,
1999) (No. 99-5172) (citing numerous cases in which defendants had argued for Singleton /); Nealon,
supra note 3. The most notorious prisoner to invoke Singleton I was Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma
City bomber. See Julie Delcour, McVeigh Appeal Won't Be Delayed, Court Rules, Tulsa World, July
18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11145386.
5. Some of the criticism of the Singleton I panel has been quite sharp. See, e.g., United States
v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 368 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1795 (1999) (stating that "the
likelihood of our knowledgeable colleagues on the Supreme Court finding as the Singleton panel's
absurd holding is nonexistent"); United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521,521-22 (D. Md. 1998)
(finding that the "chances of either or both the Fourth Circuit and [sic] the Supreme Court reaching the
same conclusion as the Singleton panel are... about the same as discovering the entire roster of the
Baltimore Orioles consists of cleverly disguised leprechauns").
6. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1302(10thCir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371
(1999).
7. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits
have all refused to adopt Singleton i. See United States v. Carroll, 166 F.3d 334, 1998 WL 801880,
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The facts underlying Singleton I were rather ordinary. The defendant was
charged with distribution of cocaine and money laundering.' During the trial, Mr.
Douglas, the defendant's accomplice, testified for the prosecution and against the
defendant.9 Prior to the trial, Mr. Douglas had entered into a plea agreement with
the prosecutor, under the terms of which the prosecutor promised leniency in
exchange for Mr. Douglas's testimony.'" Such "leniency for testimony" deals are
quite common in federal courts today." Singleton rs holding, though, was far
from common. The Tenth Circuit panel reversed the defendant's conviction and
ordered a new trial on the grounds that Mr. Douglas's bargained for testimony
should have been excluded, because its procurement by the government violated
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), the federal bribery statute, which states that "whoever...
promises anything of value.., for ... testimony" commits a felony punishable by
two years of prison. 2
This Article will not quarrel with the Singleton I characterization that promises
of leniency are equivalent to bribes' 3-although such a characterization is not
necessarily correct. 4 An offer of leniency undoubtedly encourages an accomplice
to testify rather than plead his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
To a suspect facing ajail sentence, an offer of leniency is probably more valuable
than any monetary bribe.'5 Indeed, in recognition of this fact, this Article will refer
to such offers as "leniency bribes."
at *3 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished disposition), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1089 (1999); Haese, 162
F.3d at 366-68; United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414,418-25 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1348 (1999); Condon, 170 F.3d at 688-91; United States v. Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092, 1097-98 (8th Cir.
1999), petition for cert. filed, (June 15, 1999) (No. 98-9870); United States v. Flores, 172 F.3d 695,
699-700(9th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, (June 28, 1999) (No. 99-5111); Lowery, 166 F.3d at
1122-24; United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980,986-91 (D.C. Cir. 1999),petitionforcert.filed, (July
13, 1999) (No. 99-5255). For a collection of district courtopinions rejecting and upholding Singleton
!, see Lowery, 166 F.3d at 1123.
8. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1343.
9. See id. at 1344.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 1360. The Tenth Circuit panel noted that "[n]o practice is more ingrained in our
criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the
crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea bargain that
promises him a reduced sentence." See id. (quoting United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310,
315 (5th Cir. 1987)); see also Lowery, 166 F.3d at 1123-24; Glaberson, supra note 2.
12. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1343.
13. See Singleton I. 144 F.3d at 1352, 1358 (noting that § 201(c)(2) was a "bribery" statute and
concluding that the leniency for testimony deal violated the statute).
14. One dictionary defines bribe as "[s]omething, such as money, offered to or given to induce
or influence a person to act dishonestly." American Heritage Dictionary 86 (2d college ed. 1983)
(emphasis added). A prosecutor's offer of leniency is in exchange for truthful testimony. See, e.g.,
Singleton Il, 165 F.3d at 1298. If every offer of a thing of value was characterized as a "bribe," then
everyday transactions, such as an offer of twenty-five cents for the daily newspaper, would be
considered bribes.
15. But see Condon, 170 F.3d at 689 (Easterbrook, J.) (disputing the notion that an offer of
leniency is a "thing of value").
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The acknowledgment that an element of bribery characterizes a prosecutor's
offer of leniency does not mean Singleton I was correctly decided, however. The
purpose of this Article is to explore whether leniency bribes are a desirable part of
the criminal justice system. Part H of the Article explains the reasoning behind
Singleton I and summarizes the widespread rejection of its holding. Part III of the
Article details the current practice in the federal system of offering leniency bribes
to accomplices.'6 Part IV addresses the two primary reasons-inherent unreliabil-
ity and judicial integrity-that have been advanced as justification for exclusion of
leniency-induced testimony and concludes that these reasons are insufficient to
justify exclusion. Part IV also examines the benefits and risks of leniency bribes
and proposes solutions to minimize those risks.
Although this Article concludes that Singleton I was incorrect from both a
legal and policy perspective, the practice of leniency bribes raises troubling
questions. The public expects that the criminal justice system will imprison only
those who are factually guilty; nothing is perhaps more disturbing than the notion
of an innocent person serving time for a crime he did not commit. By inducing
suspect testimony through leniency bribes, prosecutors run a small risk of
imprisoning the innocent and violating the public's legitimate expectations.
Nevertheless, the risks caused by leniency bribes are outweighed by their benefits.
Rather than prohibiting leniency bribes, prosecutors and judges should install
safeguards that will lessen their dangers.
II. THE SINGLEToN DECISION AND ITS REJECTION
Few would dispute that the law prohibits prosecutors from paying fact
witnesses monetary bribes in exchange for testimony.' 7 The act of bribing
witnesses, on its face, is repulsive to the concept of the Anglo-American trial, for
bribed testimony seems to taint the truth-finding process.'8 If monetary bribes of
witnesses are legally wrong, then how can a prosecutor argue that a leniency bribe
is legally justified? The panel that decided Singleton Icould discern no difference.
A. Singleton I
The text of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2) prohibits bribery of witnesses by providing:
(c) Whoever -
(2) directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to
any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation
16. As used in this Article, the term "accomplice" refers to the defendant's accomplice, who
cooperates with the prosecution, informs the prosecution about the crime, and testifies for the
prosecution against the defendant.
17. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1348 (noting that the government in its brief conceded that the
§ 201 (c)(2) prohibited prosecutors from offering monetary bribes to fact witnesses).
18. See id. at 1347 (stating that "[t]he judicial process is tainted and justice cheapened when
factual testimony is purchased, whether with leniency or money").
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given or to be given by such person as a witness upon trial, hearing, or
other proceeding, before any court. shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
To the Singleton I panel, the wording of the statute also prohibited federal
prosecutors from offering leniency in exchange for testimony. 9 Judge Kelly's
opinion addressed two issues in construing § 201(c)(2): (1) whether the word
"whoever" included government officials and prosecutors, 20 and (2) whether an
offer of leniency was "anything of value."'"
On the first issue, the panel stated that it was required to follow the statute's
plain language, and the word "whoever" includes federal prosecutors.' However,
the panel did acknowledge that certain classes of statutes do not apply to the
government.' The first class are those laws that, if applied to the government,
"would deprive the sovereign of a 'recognized or established prerogative title or
interest."'2" The second class consists of laws whose application to the government
would create an absurdity.'
In determining that § 201(c)(2) did not fall under the first class, the panel
recognized two exceptions to the rule that statutes should not be interpreted to
undermine an established prerogative of the government.26 First, if a statute was
meant to merely restrict the government's agent, rather than the government itself,
then a court was required to enforce the statute against the agent.2 The panel then
stated, without citation to authority, that "§ 201(c)(2) does not restrict any interest
of the sovereign itself; it operates only upon [the U.S. Attorney,] an agent of the
sovereign."2" The second exception occurs when the purpose of a statute "is to
prevent fraud, injury, or wrong."29 According to Singleton I, § 201(c)(2) also
satisfied the second exception because "[it] operates to prevent fraud upon the
federal courts in the form of inherently unreliable testimony."' The panel reasoned
that applying § 201(c)(2) to prosecutors actually advanced, rather than hindered,
the interests of the sovereign by aiding in the "enforcement of its laws and the just
administration of [the] judicial system.""3
Singleton I also found that applying § 201(c)(2) to the government did not
create an absurdity. 2  The panel explained that the classic example of an
19. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1343.
20. See id. at 1345.
21. See id. at 1348.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1345-46.
24. See id. at 1346 (quoting Norton v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383, 58 S. Ct. 275, 277
(1937)).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1346.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 1346-47.
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"absurdity" would be applying a speed limit regulation to a police officer who was
trying to catch a speeding motorist.33 In justifying why leniency bribes are not
similarly exempt, the panel invoked the Magna Carta and Justice Brandeis's famed
dissent in Olmstead v. United States' in pointing out that "[d]ecency, security and
liberty alike demand that government officials" obey the law.3" Singleton I also
noted that contract law voided contracts to pay fact witnesses as a violation of
public policy. 36 Lastly, the panel engaged in lofty rhetoric to the effect that bribes
taint the judicial process, cheapen justice, and conflict with the weighty responsi-
bility of prosecutors. Singleton I concluded that the application of § 201(c)(2) to
prosecutors-rather than being absurd-was at the center of the American legal
tradition.37
After declaring that the word "whoever" in § 201(c)(2) included U.S.
attorneys, the panel proceeded to the second issue of whether an offer of leniency
was "anything of value., 38 The panel stated that the test should be "whether the
recipient subjectively attaches value to the thing received"; 39 moreover, Singleton
I noted that many other courts had held intangible things to be "things of value,"
including, inter alia, information regarding the location of a witness, information
in a DEA report, assistance in arranging a merger, and conjugal visits.' Further-
more, the panel reasoned that the congressional purpose behind § 201 (c)(2) was to
"to keep testimony free of all influence so that truthfulness is protected."' The
panel ruled an offer of leniency to be "anything of value" by concluding that there
was "no basis in law, policy, or common sense" to hold otherwise.42
33. See id. at 1346.
34. 277 U.S. 438,48 S. Ct. 564(1928).
35. Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Olnstead, 277 U.S. at 485,48 S. Ct. at 575 (Brandeis,
J. dissenting)). This reasoning begged the question, since the issue before the court was whether
prosecutors did, indeed, need to obey the law-that is. specifically § 201(c)(2).
36. See Singleton!. 144 F.3d at 1346.
37. See id. at 1348.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 1349.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 1350. The panel listed three other reasons for its holding based upon statutory
construction. First, the panel reasoned that much of the precedent cited had construed statutes with the
phrase "thing of value," but § 201(c)(2) contained the words "anything of value," which indicated an
even broader construction. Second, much of precedent cited interpreted statutes in which "thing of
value" was at the end of a series, indicating that courts had construed the term constrained by the
doctrine of ejusdem generis. In contrast, § 201(c)(2) contained no such enumeration, leaving it to be
more broadly interpreted. Third, § 201(c)(1), which criminalizes bribery of public officials, includes
the language, "otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty," while
§ 201(c)(2) is free of any such language, indicating that if Congress wanted to exempt official acts from
bribery of witnesses, it would have included language similar to that found in § 201(c)(1). See id. at
1349-50.
42. Id.
[Vol. 60
BRYAN S. GOWDY
After holding that a prosecutor's leniency bribe was illegal under § 201(c)(2),43
the panel addressed the issue of whether exclusion of the illegally-obtained
testimony was the appropriate remedy. The panel cited two public policies to
justify suppression of leniency-induced testimony. First, it would deter official
misconduct. The panel reasoned that since the practice of offering leniency for
testimony was so widespread in the criminal justice system, exclusion of the
testimony was the only effective means of stopping future violations of
§ 201(c)(2)." Second, the panel stated that exclusion was necessary to protect
"judicial integrity." The panel noted that an accomplice who is offered a leniency
bribe is tempted "to color or falsify" his testimony.' In the panel's opinion, this
temptation to fabricate taints an accomplice's testimony, and to present such tainted
testimony in a court would directly impugn the judiciary's integrity.
47
In summary, the Singleton I panel found that § 201(c)(2), the witness bribery
statute, barred testimony by accomplices who had been offered leniency bribes."
The term "whoever" in § 201 (c)(2) included federal prosecutors, and the language
"anything of value" encompassed offers of leniency.49 Finally, a violation of
§ 201(c)(2) warranted exclusion of any leniency-induced accomplice testimony."°
B. Justifications for Leniency Bribes
Singleton I was a startling opinion because it challenged the well-estab-
lished-and many believe essential-prosecutorial practice of offering leniency in
exchange for testimony.5 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit panel mounted its
challenge by relying on the plain meaning of a statute that had been on the books
since 1962.52 An Eleventh Circuit case probably best summarizes the legal
community's disbelief as to the logic of Singleton 1:
43. Besides the statutory construction arguments discussed, see supra notes 19-41 and
accompanying text, the panel also based its holding on the structure of § 201(c)(2), the relation of
§ 201(c)(2) to other statutes, and public policy justifications for its holding. See Singleton L 144 F.3d
at 1351-56. Additionally, the panel noted that the prosecutor had violated Rule 3.4(b) of the Kansas
Rules of Professional Conduct (adopted from the Model Rules), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not.., offer an inducement to a witness prohibited by law." See Singleton !, at 1358-59; see also
United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd by, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th
Cir. 1999),petitionforcert.filed, (July 6,1999) (No. 99-5172) (finding that the prosecutor had violated
a similar Florida rule).
44. See Singleton 1. 144 F.3d at 1359-60.
45. See id. at 1360. The issue of judicial integrity is discussed more fully below. See infra Part
IV.A.2.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 22-47 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 241-245 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 1.
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During the three and half decades of [the bribery statute's] existence,
what defendants now claim is the plain meaning of that language has not
been plain to thousands of prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers who
have been involved with testimony for leniency agreements over the
decades. If the language of the statute did plainly provide that it is a
crime for the government to trade leniency for testimony, the issue would
have been raised early and often. It was not. 3
Nonetheless, a mere argument that "we've always done it this way" would be
insufficient to refute Singleton I's contention that § 201(c)(2) outlawed leniency
bribes. In response to Singleton I, courts have advanced two primary legal
justifications for leniency bribes. The firstjustification is grounded in the common
law and the history of American jurisprudence, ' while the second is rooted in
principles of statutory construction."
1. Prerogative of the Sovereign
To justify exempting prosecutors from § 201 (c)(2), some courts have argued
that leniency bribes have long been a prerogative of the sovereign." At early
common law, an accomplice might try to bargain for leniency through a process
known as "approvement."57 The accomplice would confess and then offer to bring
a private prosecution against his confederate involved with the crime. The
accomplice would receive a pardon only if the jury convicted his confederate;
otherwise, the accomplice faced execution.59 Approvement fell into disfavor by
1500, because it seemed to elicit perjury.' A related practice soon developed, in
which accomplices who provided information were entitled to an equitable title to
a pardon, so long as they testified "fully and fairly," regardless of the jury's verdict
for the defendant.6' Under this later system, an accomplice could only testify if he
was less culpable than the defendant. 2
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the power to bargain for leniency in
exchange for testimony rested with the court, not the prosecutor.6' Eventually the
law allowed prosecutors to bargain for testimony by offering pardons, immunity,
53. United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1123 (11 th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, (July
6, 1999) (No. 99-5172).
54. See infra Part II.B.I.
55. See infra Part Il.B.2.
56. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
57. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 Colum. L Rev. 1, 14 (1979);
see also Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Conditional Promise of Immunity, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 138,
139 (1952).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See Note, supra note 57, at 139.
61. See id.
62. See Alschuler, supra note 57, at 14-15.
63. See id. at 15.
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and other forms of leniency." By 1878, the Supreme Court in The Whiskey Cases65
acknowledged that many American jurisdictions permitted the prosecutor to
bargain for testimony with leniency bribes." As Professor Alschuler has noted,
The Whiskey Cases revealed that "the common law did permit a sacrifice of the
public interest in punishing a single offender in order to gain his assistance in
convicting other criminals, and it devised an open and regularized form of
bargaining to accomplish this result."67 Relying upon the history of the common
law, the Singleton II majority and other courts have held that the "granting of
lenience in exchange for testimony has created a vested sovereign prerogative in
the government," which has become an "ingrained" part of Anglo-American
jurisprudence."' Statutes of general applicability, such as 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), do
not apply to the sovereign, unless the legislature had made application to the
sovereign "clear and undisputable"; the language of section 201 (c)(2), "whoever,"
is not sufficiently clear so as to include the sovereign.'s The defendant in Singleton
II argued that the "whoever" of section 201(c)(2) did include the sovereign's
agent-the individual U.S. Attorney--even if it did not encompass the sovereign
entity of the United States.7" The Singleton II majority countered that when
prosecuting, a U.S. Attorney was exercising the sovereign powers of the United
States, thereby making the U.S. Attorney the alter ego of the government and
inseparable from the sovereign.7 As the alter ego, the U.S. Attorney is exempt
from statutes of general applicability.
The "alter ego" argument advanced by the majority has at least two problems.
First, as Judge Lucero opined in his Singleton II concurrence, the majority opinion
might be read to permit monetary bribes by prosecutors.72 For example, would a
64. See Note, supra note 57, at 139-40 & nn.8-10. Professor Alschuler contends that plea
bargaining, though, was not a means for a prosecutor to induce an accomplice's testimony. Rather,
courts only permitted prosecutors to bargain for testimony by offering something equivalent to
transactional immunity. See Alschuler, supra note 57, at 15-16.
65. 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 594 (1878).
66. See id. at 604. The Supreme Court stated:
Prosecutors... [should] inform [the accomplice] just what he may reasonably expect in case
he acts in good faith, and testifies fully and fairly as to his own acts in the case, and those
of associates. When he fulfills those conditions he is equitably entitled to a pardon, and the
prosecutor, and the court if need be, when fully informed of the facts, will join in such a
recommendation.
Id.
67. Alschuler, supra note 57, at 15. Professor Alschuler, a critic of plea bargaining in general,
has acknowledged that leniency bribes are an "unusually strong case for permitting some form of plea
bargaining." Id.
68. Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1301; see also United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 988 (D.C.
Cir. 1999),petitionforcert. filed, (July 13,1999) (No. 99-5255); United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359,
367 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1795 (1999); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 419
(6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999).
69. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1300.
70. See id. at 1299.
71. Seeid.at1300&n.l.
72. See id. at 1303 (Lucero, J. concurring).
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U.S. Attorney who offers a monetary bribe to a witness in furtherance of the
prosecution be exempt from prosecution under the alter ego theory? The majority
contended otherwise, because the bribe would be neither a "government function"
nor a "prosecutorial act[]... recognized in common law or authorized by statute.""'
Second, even if the Singleton 11 majority is correct about its interpretation of the
common law,74 its reliance upon the common law to determine when the prosecutor
is an alter ego is problematic." In order to determine whether a U.S. Attorney must
abide by a criminal statute, a court must analyze whether the U.S. Attorney is
performing a "prerogative of the sovereign," as defined by the common law.
Gleaning through Anglo-American history and the common law to determine which
prosecutorial acts are "prerogatives of the sovereign" will only muddle the law,
since the common law is rarely crystal clear.76 Rather than making an alter ego
argument, a better method for determining the appropriateness of prosecutorial
actions may be to rely upon statutes and examine what powers Congress has
specifically bestowed on U.S. Attorneys.
2. Statutory Power to Offer Leniency Bribes
In his concurrence in Singleton 11, Judge Lucero set forth a statutory argument
to justify the existence of leniency bribes.77 The statutory argument acknowledges
that the language of § 201(c)(2), when read by itself, does prohibit U.S. Attorneys
from offering leniency bribes. But when read "in conjunction with other statutes"
which do permit the U.S. Attorney "to trade certain items of value for testimony,"
a different result is mandated.78  At least three sets of statutes-all of which
provide "things of value" to testifying accomplices-are so specific that they must
overrule the general prohibition contained in § 201(c)(2).79
. First, the immunity statutes specifically authorize U.S. Attorneys to request
immunity for witnesses who will provide "testimony or other information ... [that]
73. See id. at 1302 n.2.
74. On the other hand, one could argue that sincejudges, and not prosecutors, controlled leniency
offers for a long duration of the common law that it is not entirely clear whether leniency bribes are a
"prerogative of the sovereign." See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75. See Singleton 11, 165 F.3d at 1308 (Lucero, J. concurring) (stating that the majority opinion
had "create[d] a conceptually messy legal regime for handling the case of the errant United States
Attorney").
76. Another example of the potential problems created by the majority opinion is 18 U.S.C. §
1622, which prohibits "whoever" from suborning perjury. The majority contended that § 1622 would
apply to U.S. Attorneys-despite the identical "whoever" language as § 201(c)(2)-because suborning
perjury was plainly not an exercise of sovereign power. See id. at 1302 n.2. The majority's brief
resolution, in dicta, about the applicability of § 1622 seems to be based really on intuition, rather than
a common law analysis.
77. See id. at 1303-08 (Lucero, J. concurring).
78. Id. at 1303 (Lucero, J. concurring).
79. Judge Lucero also mentioned that a "bar to pre-testimony negotiation would contradict the
intent of Fed. R. Crim. P. I." See Singleton I1, 165 F.3d at 1307. The rule provides that the "attorney
for the government and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage
in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
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may be necessary to the public interest."' Second, the Witness Relocation and
Protection Act authorizes the Attorney General to offer a whole range of "things
of value" to cooperating witnesses, including, inter alia, housing, moving
expenses, living expenses, and a job."' Third, and perhaps most critical, the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 specifies that the government may offer the
possibility of a lower sentence to an accomplice for his "substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person. 182
The members of the Singleton I panel, as dissenters in Singleton II, countered
that their construction of § 201 (c)(2) had been consistent with these other statutes.
8 3
First, the dissenters agreed that the immunity statutes did overrule § 201(c)(2), but
only in cases of formal court-ordered immunity; all other forms of leniency are
subject to § 201(c)(2).s" Second, they argued that the Witness Relocation and
Protection Act was "concerned with the welfare of witnesses, not with obtaining
testimony."8" Finally, the dissenters interpreted "substantial assistance," to mean
only assistance that fell short of actual testimony.86 In response to dissenters' last
point, Judge Lucero stated that although some "substantial assistance" could be
non-testimonial, there could "be little doubt that Congress intended to include...
cooperative testimony under the rubric of 'substantial assistance,"' and "it
stretche[d] credulity to suppose that Congress intended to exclude cooperative
testimony from 'substantial assistance' as used in these statutes."8
'
C. Summary
Of all the opinions, Judge Lucero's concurrence in Singleton II is most
convincing, because unlike the narrow focus of the Singleton Ipanel, Judge Lucero
examined all congressional legislation, not just the language of § 201(c)(2), when
attempting to glean congressional intent and policy.88 By focusing on the words
"whoever" and "thing of value," the Singleton I panel failed to see the true
congressional purpose. The federal statutes permitting prosecutors to offer things
of value for testimony makes it exceedingly clear that Congress did not intend to
prohibit leniency bribes and also makes resort to the ambiguous common law
unnecessary. Although Judge Lucero's reliance upon federal statutes is the best
method for validating the practice of leniency bribes, it does not settle the issue of
whether leniency bribes are sound public policy. In order to address this issue, one
80. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1994).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1)(B)-(E) (1994).
82. 2 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994). Based on this authority, the Sentencing Commission created the
§ 5Kl.1 "substantial assistance" departure. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. Another
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), permits prosecutors to move for a sentence below the statutory mandatory
minimum if the defendant provides "substantial assistance." See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
83. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1309-10 (Kelly, J. dissenting).
84. See id. at 1313 (Kelly, J. dissenting).
85. Id. (Kelly, J. dissenting).
86. See id. at 1312-13 (Kelly, J. dissenting).
87. Id. at 1306-07 (Lucero, J. concurring)
88. See supra notes 77-82, 87 and accompanying text.
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must fully comprehend the mechanics of the federal practice of offering leniency
bribes.
Ell. FEDERAL PRACTICE OF OFFERING LENIENCY BRIBES
A bribe is "something that serves to induce or influence."89 For any bribe to
take place, a mutually agreed upon currency must be used for the transaction, and
the briber must have the power to influence or induce the bribee. With a monetary
bribe, the currency is usually dollars, and the power of the briber over the bribee
depends upon the amount of dollars in the briber's pocket. For a leniency bribe,
the currency is leniency, and the prosecutor's power over an accomplice depends
upon the potential sentence and the prosecutor's ability to impose and to reduce
that sentence.
To find how much currency she has and how valuable it might be to an
accomplice, a prosecutor must make three fundamental calculations. First, she
must master the labyrinth of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and determine the
possible sentence that an accomplice faces.9  Second, the prosecutor must
determine which type of leniency bribe is permitted under Department of Justice
policy.9' Third, the prosecutor must calculate how the court may alter or influence
the leniency bribe.'
A. Sentencing Guidelines
1. Basics of Federal Sentencing
The Sentencing Guidelines originated with the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984,9' which created the United States Sentencing Commission and
directed it to establish uniform sentencing standards for all federal courts.94 To
achieve this goal, the Commission instituted a detailed procedure for calculating
a convicted defendant's sentence. Under this procedure, a prosecutor must
examine a number of factors to determine an accomplice's possible sentencing
range.9 The two most important factors are the "offense-level" and "criminal
history" of an accomplice.96 Every sentence is determined by a matrix with a
89. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 178 (1987).
90. See infra part 11.A.
91. See infra part II.B.
92. See infra part In.C.
93. Pub. L No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2017-34 (1984) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)).
94. See William L Gardner& David S. Rififind, A Basic Guide to Plea Bargaining, 7 Crim. Just.
14, 14-15 (1992).
95. See id. at 15.
96. See Eric R. Komitee, Note, Bargains Without Benefits: Do the Sentencing Guidelines Permit
Upward Departures to Redress the Dismissal of Charges Pursuant to Plea Bargains?, 70 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 166, 169 (1995).
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horizontal "offense-level" axis and a vertical "criminal history" axis;' the
sentencing range for a particular accomplice is the intersection of the two axes."
Arriving at the appropriate "offense level" involves a series of steps. First, and
probably most importantly, the prosecutor must choose the charge to bring against
an accomplice and then determine the "base offense level" for that charge." For
example, robbery has a base offense level of twenty." Second, the prosecutor
must examine whether the defendant's crime involves any of the "specific offense
characteristics" which may alter the offense level.' Continuing with the robbery
example, if a firearm was discharged during the robbery; the offense level increases
upward by seven levels." 2 Third, the Guidelines may mandate an "adjustment. ' '"e3
For example, an adjustment that is frequently important is an accomplice's role in
the offense."° If the accomplice was an organizer or leader of criminal activity,
then the accomplice's offense level is adjusted upward by four levels."° Other
adjustments take into account the harm caused to a victim,"° the accomplice's
motivation for targeting the victim,"'7 any obstruction of justice by the
accomplice,"° and whether the accomplice has accepted responsibility. ' 9
After finding the appropriate offense level, the prosecutor must determine the
accomplice's criminal history category."0 The rules for calculating criminal history
appear simple, but they involve a host of interpretative problems. For example, the
Guidelines state that convictions that have been "set aside" are to be counted in the
criminal history, but convictions that have been "expunged" are not counted."'
Making the distinction between "set aside" and "expunged" is not always easy,
especially when dealing with laws of different jurisdictions.
After determining the accomplice's offense level and criminal history category,
the prosecutor looks to the matrix to find an accomplice's sentencing range under
the Guidelines. The prosecutor's calculation, however, is not yet finished, as she
also must examine whether the accomplice can receive a "departure." Departures
permit the sentencing judge to disregard the Guidelines altogether and to give a
defendant a lower (or possibly higher) sentence than the one prescribed by the
Guidelines."' The most routinely-used departure is the "substantial assistance"
97. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5A (1998).
98. See id.
99. See id. § IB1.1(b).
100. See id. § 2B3.1(a).
101. See id. § IB1.1(b).
102. See id. § 2B3.1(b)(2).
103. See id. § IB1.1(c).
104. See id. § 3BI.I.
105. See id. § 3BI.l(a).
106. See id. § 3A1.3.
107. See id. § 3A.I.
108. See id. § 3C1.1.
109. See id. § 3EI.I.
110. See id. § IB1.1(f).
111. See id. § 4AI.20) & cmt. 10.
112. See id. § IB 1.1(i); Gardner & Rifind, supra note 94, at 17.
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departure, which was the leniency bribe at issue in Singleton .113 The "substantial
assistance departure" is more commonly known as a § 5KI departure (or a Rule
35(b) motion)." 4 The prosecutor has the sole discretion to move for a § 5KI
departure if she determines that the accomplice "has provided substantial assistance
in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense."" 15
Two other points are worth noting about the Guidelines. First, some statutes
specify mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses." 6 An accomplice's
sentence cannot be lower than the mandatory minimum irrespective of the
sentencing range dictated by the Guidelines. However, just as a § 5Ki departure
permits ajudge to disregard the Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) allows ajudge to
depart below the mandatory minimum when the prosecutor, in her sole discretion,
certifies that the accomplice has provided "substantial assistance in the investiga-
tion or prosecution of another person.''. The "substantial assistance" required to
receive a § 3553(e) departure is indistinguishable from that required for a § 5K1
departure. Thus, all discussion hereinafter relating to § 5Ki departures is equally
germane to § 3553(e) departures.
Second, an accomplice charged with multiple counts can incur a sentence for
each count,"' thereby giving more power to a prosecutor who is able to bring
multiple charges." 9 The Guidelines direct that "closely related counts" be placed
into a single group for purposes of determining the offense level; however, like
113. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5KI.1 (1998). In fiscal year 1998. courts granted
substantial assistance departures in 9,224 sentences, constituting 19.3% of all federal sentences. By
comparison, courts granted all other types of downward departures in 6,509 sentences, constituting
13.6% of all federal sentences. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1998 Sourcebook of Federal
Sentencing Statistics 53, Table 26 (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/
1998/sbtoc.98.htm>.
114. The difference between a § 5KI motion and a Rule 35(b) motion is one of timing. A § 5KI
motion is filed at an accomplice's sentencing, while a Rule 35(b) motion is filed after sentencing. See
U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.400 (1997). Rule 35(b) permits the judge to re-sentence the accomplice
in lieu of his post-sentence cooperation. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b). However, the difference in timing
is immaterial, because prosecutors will not file either motion until after the accomplice has provided
his substantial assistance, i.e. has testified against his coconspirator. The U.S. Attorney's Manual treats
the two motions identically, and so will this Article.
115. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5KI.l (1998).
116. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994); see Melendez v. United States. 518 U.S. 120, 116 S. Ct. 2057
(1996); U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.730(1997). The sentencing statutes do provide a possible means
for a defendant to escape the mandatory minimum requirements, despite the lack of a government
motion, and to be sentenced under the Guidelines, so long as several criteria are satisfied. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(0 (1994).
118. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § IB.LI (1998).
119. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 Cal. L Rev. 1471,
1475, 1505-17 (1993) (noting that "[b]ecause the sentencing guidelines are largely 'charge-offense
based,' the eventual sentencing outcome is determined primarily by the crime with which the prosecutor
charges the defendant").
120. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3D1.2 (1998).
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other parts of the Guidelines, determining what counts as "closely related" is not
always simple.
2. Factors Controlled by the Prosecutor
As noted earlier, leniency is the currency used in the prosecutor's bribe of an
accomplice, and the amount of currency available to the prosecutor depends upon
her power to threaten and to reduce a sentence. To calculate the currency and
power available to her under the Guidelines, the prosecutor must identify
sentencing factors that she controls or influences. Generally, there are three such
factors.
The first factor controlled by the prosecutor is the accomplice's offense level.
For example, first degree murder has a base offense level of forty-three, which
translates into a life sentence regardless of past criminal history, 2' but voluntary
manslaughter has a base offense level of twenty-five, which could result in a
sentence as low as fifty-seven months.'22 Because the only difference between
murder and manslaughter is state of mind, which is an amorphous concept, a
prosecutor acting in good-faith could probably charge either crime. Therefore, a
prosecutor can effectively bribe an accomplice by threatening a murder charge but
offering to reduce the charge to manslaughter if the accomplice cooperates.
The second key factor controlled by the prosecutor is the § 5K1 or "substantial
assistance" departure. Favorable testimony for the prosecution undoubtedly falls
under the definition of "substantial assistance." For a defendant to obtain a § 5K1
departure, the prosecutor must initiate a motion. Without prosecutorial consent, a
defendant cannot argue for a "substantial assistance" departure, nor can the
sentencing judge consider the departure sua sponte.23  Commentators have
emphasized the enormous power that a prosecutor wields over a defendant through
the § 5K1 departure. 24 Statistical evidence also supports the proposition that the
§ 5K1 departure is the most valuable bribe a prosecutor can offer an accomplice.
In fiscal year 1998, the median decrease for "substantial assistance" departures was
twenty-six months below the minimum guideline sentences, resulting in a median
121. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2Al.1, 5A (1998).
122. See id. §§ 2A1.3, 5A.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Ronald S. Safer& Matthew C. Crowl, SubstantialAssistance Departures: Valuable
Tool or Dangerous Weapon, 12 Fed. Sent. R. 41 (1999) (describing how the §5K1 departure, coupled
with long mandatory sentences, lured previously uncooperative members of a Chicago gang to testify
against gang leaders); Cynthia Lee & Brian Derdowski, Jr., The Future of Substantial Assistance:
Recommendations for Reform, 11 Fed. Sent. R. 78 (1998) ("Many in the criminal defense community
... would be happy if the substantial assistance departure were eliminated. The provision fosters
distrust amongst defendants by encouraging defendants to testify against one another. Some defense
attorneys feel so strongly that they refuse to represent clients who desire to cooperate with the
government."); Gardner & Rificind, supra note 94, at 17 ("(The substantial assistance] departure
provides the prosecutor with the greatest flexibility .... [M]ost prosecutors are unwilling to commit
to a downward departure until they.., have determined the information is important enough to warrant
a lesser sentence.").
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sentence reduction of 50.4%; in contrast, the median decrease for all other types
of downward departures was ten months below the minimum guideline sentence,
resulting in a median sentence reduction of 35.1%.'" In another survey, 83.3% of
drug-trafficking defendants who provided testimony in return for a § 5K1 departure
received a sentence reduction of four years or more; by comparison, only 45.0%
of those drug-trafficking defendants who provided only verbal information-but
did not testify-received a sentence reduction of four years or more.
2 6
The third factor is, in reality, a range of factors that the prosecutor can
influence, though not control, through his presentation of facts to the court. These
factors include specific offense characteristics, general offense level adjustments,
and criminal history." 7 For example, suppose an accomplice has robbed a bank,
but the police are uncertain whether the accomplice was the leader and cannot
positively establish that a firearm was "brandished, displayed, or possessed" during
the robbery. Also suppose that the accomplice has been convicted in state court of
a D.U.I., but the state records are unclear as to whether the D.U.I. was "set aside"
or "expunged." The sentencing judge must resolve each of these factual issues to
find the accomplice's appropriate sentence. In a plea bargain scenario, the judge
will not have had the benefit of a full trial to hear evidence. Therefore, the judge
depends, in part, on the representations of the prosecutor at the sentencing hearing.
In order to elicit the accomplice's cooperation, the prosecutor may offer to inform
the court that the accomplice was not a leader, did not possess a firearm, and that
his D.U.I. conviction has been expunged.
B. Department of Justice Policy
The Sentencing Guidelines define the maximum currency that a prosecutor has
available to offer to an accomplice. However, Department of Justice ("DOJ")
policy regulates a prosecutor's power to spend that currency. The DOJ permits
prosecutors to offer leniency bribes through four general types of agreements: (1)
immunity agreements,' 28 (2) charge agreements, 9 (3) sentence agreements,' 30 and
(4) fact stipulation agreements.13 ' Frequently, prosecutors will use a combination
of these types of agreements when structuring a leniency offer.1
32
125. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1998 Annual Report 39.
126. See Unda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer, Substantial Assistance: An Empirical
Yardstick: Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy and Mostice 32 (Jan. 1998), located at
<http//www.ussc.gov/pdf/5kreport.pdf>.
127. See supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
128. See infra Part TI.BI.
129. See infra Part iII.B.2.
130. See infra Part In.B.3. Prosecutors can also enter into "mixed agreements," which contain
both a charge agreement and a sentence agreement. See U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.400 (1997).
131. See infra Part iIM.B.4.
132. Cf. Safer & Crowl, supra note 124, at 42-43 (noting the "plethora of options open to the
parties in structuring plea agreements").
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Before exploring the specific components of these agreements, it is important
to emphasize that DOJ policy requires that all agreements be recorded in writing.'
Furthermore, with the exception of an informal immunity agreement, the prosecutor
must file papers with the court, and any plea agreement with the accomplice must
be revealed in open court." Leniency bribes are not secretive affairs: counsel for
the accused can ascertain the exact nature of a leniency bribe in order to impeach
the accomplice at trial. 3
1. Immunity Agreements
Every accomplice would probably prefer an immunity agreement, as it entails
no conviction and no sentence.'36 Formal immunity agreements are statutory-based
and require the approval of an Assistant or Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
They must also be cleared by the Criminal Division. 7 Prosecutors are directed to
seek authorization for a formal immunity agreement only if it is "necessary to the
public" interest and the accomplice will likely "refuse to testify.., on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination."' 38 Once a prosecutor receives authoriza-
tion from DOJ officials, she must file a motion with the court to compel the
testimony of the immunized accomplice. 39 The only type of formal immunity is
use immunity (sometime called derivative-use immunity), which prohibits the
government from using the accomplice's immunized testimony, or any evidence
derived thereof, in a subsequent prosecution. "4 If the government does choose to
prosecute an accomplice who has been granted use immunity, the government has
the burden of proving that the evidence presented at trial is "derived from a
legitimate source, wholly independent of the compelled testimony. '4 1
133. See U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.400,9-27.450,9-27.650(1997).
134. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
135. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766 (1972) (reversing
conviction for nondisclosure of promise made to witness); and Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
311-12, 87 S. Ct. 408, 418 (1966) (noting that "(a]t the trial .... [the accomplice-witness] was
subjected to rigorous cross-examination, and the extent and nature of his dealings with federal and state
authorities were insistently explored").
136. Cf. Timothy D. Scandurro, Immunity, 24 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 839, 839 (1987) (noting that
white-collar "defendants are often receptive to immunity offers to avoid the continued threat of criminal
prosecution").
137. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1994); U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-23.130 (1997).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1994); see U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-23.210 (1997).
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1994); see U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-23.110 (1997). The court's
role in granting an immunity order is minor, as it is merely required to find the facts upon which the
order is predicated. See U.S. v. Singleton (Singleton I1), 165 F.3d 1297,1306 (10th Cir. 1999) (Lucero,
J. concurring).
140. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 1659 (1972); Roger C.
Spaeder, The Challenge of Negotiating Immunity: What You Must Know Before You Seek Immunity
for Your Client, 7 Crim. Just. 8, 9 (1992).
141. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S. Ct. at 1665; see also U.S. Department of Justice Criminal
Resource Manual 718, located at <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia..reading-room/usan/>.
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A close cousin of formal immunity is informal immunity, which is not
statutory-based and is often referred to as a non-prosecution agreement.142 The
validity of informal immunity agreements are judged by contract law. 43 A
prosecutor need only receive authorization for such contracts from the local U.S.
Attorney or a supervisory assistant U.S. attorney, but such agreements still must be
in "the public interest" and should only be pursued when "other means," including
a formal agreement, "are unavailable."'" In most respects, informal agreements are
less valuable because they are not binding upon state prosecutors and may not even
be binding upon U.S. Attorneys in other judicial districts. 45 Furthermore,
prosecutors who are dissatisfied with an accomplice's testimony have more leeway
to argue that the accomplice has breached the informal immunity agreement by not
providing full cooperation.'" In other aspects, however, an informal immunity
agreement can be more valuable to an accomplice, because a prosecutor is able to
grant protection-such as transactional immunity-that goes beyond the use
immunity provided by statute. 47
2. Charge Agreements
If the cooperation that an accomplice offers is not valuable enough to merit an
immunity deal, the prosecutor may still be willing to offer a leniency bribe in the
form of a charge agreement. As mentioned before, a prosecutor can exert
significant control over an accomplice's possible sentence through the selection of
charges. 4 With a charge agreement, the prosecutor promises not to pursue certain
charges or to drop current charges, thereby reducing the accomplice's offense level
and sentence under the Guidelines. '" Of course, the prosecutor does not have free
reign to pick and choose charges. The U.S. Attorney's Manual directs that a
prosecutor must file a charge if she "believes that the person's conduct constitutes
a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to
obtain and sustain a conviction. ' "° Prior to the filing of charges, an individual
prosecutor has considerable discretion in declining to pursue a case, but once
142. See U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 141, at719. Informal
immunity is also called "pocket immunity" or "letter immunity." See id.
143. See id.; Spaeder, supra note 140, at 10.
144. See U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.600 (1997).
145. See U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 141, at 719; U.S.
Attorney's Manual 9-27.630 (1997); Spaeder, supra note 140, at 10.
146. See Spaeder, supra note 140, at 10.
147. See id.; Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 8.11(d), at 427 (2d ed.
1992). Transactional immunity protects an accomplice from being prosecuted for the offenses about
which he testifies, with the exception of prosecution for perjurious testimony. See U.S. Department of
Justice Criminal Resource Manual, supra note 141, at 719.
148. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
149. See Gardner & Rifiind, supra note 94, at 15.
150. U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.220 (1997).
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charges are filed, the prosecutor may only drop a charge with the approval of the
U.S. Attorney or a "designated supervisory level official." '
Since prosecutorial resources are scarce, DOJ policy permits a U.S. Attorney
to decline filing charges when "[n]o substantial Federal interest would be
served"; furthermore, an accomplice's "willingness to cooperate in the...
prosecution of others" is one factor among many to be weighed in determining a
"substantial Federal interest."' The nature and seriousness of the offense, the
deterrent effect of prosecution, criminal history and culpability are some other
factors that a prosecutor must consider when deciding whether to drop charges
against an accomplice. 4
3. Sentence Agreements
A sentence agreement occurs when the prosecutor agrees to take "a certain
position regarding the sentence to be imposed.'" 5 A prosecutor may offer to take
no position regarding the accomplice's sentence, to refrain from opposing the
accomplice's sentence request, or to recommend a specific fine or term of
imprisonment.'5 6 However, the prosecutor cannot guarantee a particular sentence,
because sentencing, unlike charging, is within the province of the judge. 7 This
judicial limitation on prosecutorial power makes a sentence agreement less
attractive to an accomplice than a charge agreement.
For any sentencing agreement, DOJ policy permits a prosecutor to negotiate
one of three options. Under the first option, a prosecutor agrees to recommend or
not oppose a specific sentence within a sentencing range but refuses to seek from
the judge any departures or adjustments.5 For example, if the accomplice is
facing a thirty-three to forty-one month sentencing range under the Guidelines, the
prosecutor may choose to recommend or not oppose a thirty-three month sentence.
Under this first option, the prosecution and accomplice sometimes reach a "specific
sentence agreement," which permits an accomplice to withdraw his plea if the
judge does not accept the prosecutor's recommended sentence' 9 The U.S.
Attorney's Manual does not specifically require any supervisory approval for these
agreements."
A second option permits the prosecutor to agree to recommend a downward
adjustment.'61 This option will be greatly dependent on the facts that the prosecutor
151. Id. at 9-27.400; see Gardner & Rifkind, supra note 94, at 16-17.
152. U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.220 (1997).
153. See id. at 9-27.230.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 9-27.710 (stating that "[s]entencing in Federal criminal cases is primarily the
function and responsibility of the court"); see also Gardner & Rifkind, supra note 94, at 16.
158. See U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.400 (1997). "
159. See Gardner & Rifkind, supra note 94, at 16.
160. See U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.400 (1997).
161. See id.
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presents to the court. As an example, the prosecutor may argue to the court that the
accomplice has accepted responsibility for his wrongdoing, thereby lowering the
accomplice's offense level by two levels. Like the first option, the U.S. Attorney's
Manual does not dictate supervisory approval for these agreements.' 62
The third and most lucrative option for the accomplice is a prosecutorial
agreement to file a § 5K1 motion. As noted earlier, the § 5K1 motion permits the
judge to impose a sentence outside of the range mandated by the Guidelines. 63
Under this option, a prosecutor may also recommend or not oppose a specific
sentence outside of the Guidelines.'" DOJ policy mandates that a prosecutor
receive authorization from superiors prior to filing a § 5K1 motion, but local U.S.
Attorneys are given flexibility in formulating an authorization process. 65
However, a recent study indicates that many U.S. Attorney offices are ignoring
their own local procedures, while nearly twenty percent of the offices do not even
have procedures in writing.'"
Prosecutorial discretion for any sentence agreement is limited by a DOJ policy,
which mandates that sentencing bargaining "must honestly reflect the totality and
seriousness of the defendant's conduct.""67 Any recommendation for a downward
adjustment must be done in "good faith.' With respect to departures from the
Guidelines, DOJ policy states that prosecutors should not determine on their own
that a departure is appropriate and then attempt to conceal the departure via a
charge agreement.'69 Rather, prosecutors are expected to identify departures to the
court, so that the court can independently review its appropriateness. 7°
4. Fact Stipulation Agreements
Lastly, as previously noted, an accomplice's sentence is heavily dependent
upon how the facts are presented to the court.' Accomplices sometimes seek fact
stipulation agreements, so that their conduct is presented as favorably as possible
to the sentencing judge.' 2 However, both DOJ policy and the Guidelines limit the
extent to which a prosecutor may "fudge" facts in order to induce cooperation from
an accomplice. The U.S. Attorney's Manual states that prosecutors should "ensure
that the relevant facts are brought to the court's attention fully and accurately,"'73
162. See id.
163. See supra notes 112-115, 123-24 and accompanying text.
164. See U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.730 (1997).
165. See id. at 9-27.400. Authorization may be sought from the U.S. Attorney, the Chief Assistant
U.S. Attorney, a supervisory criminal Assistant U.S. Attorney, or a committee composing at least one
of the aforementioned individuals.
166. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 126, at 7-8, 24-25.
167. See U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.400 (1997).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
172. See Gardner & Rifkind, supra note 94, at 16.
173. See U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.710 (1997).
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and the Guidelines specify that a fact stipulation agreement "shall... not contain
misleading facts."' 74 Nevertheless, prosecutors and accomplices probably have
some flexibility when presenting unclear or unascertainable facts. 7 '
C. Role of the Judiciary
Some might justifiably express skepticism that executive branch policy can
effectively regulate the leniency bribe practice. However, a prosecutor's power to
spend leniency currency is not solely governed by DOJ policy. Before offering a
leniency bribe, the prosecutor must also consider the judiciary's role. The judicial
branch has two important functions in the leniency bribe process. 6 First, the
judge, not the prosecutor, imposes an accomplice's sentence. 77 Second, the judge
may caution the jury about the reliability of accomplice testimony induced by a
leniency bribe.7 8
1. Sentencing
A judge has considerable discretion in a number of areas when sentencing an
accomplice. Doubt as to how a judge will exercise this discretion creates
uncertainty in the terms of a leniency bribe contract. Such uncertainty diminishes
the prosecutor's power to deal, since the prosecutor is unable to guarantee a
sentence for the accomplice. Moreover, ajudge does not make sentencing decisions
based solely upon facts and recommendations presented by the prosecutor, for an
accomplice is free to present his own evidence and to argue how the Guidelines
should be applied. 79 Furthermore, the probation officer, who is independent from
the U.S. Attorney and works for the judiciary, prepares a pre-sentencing investiga-
tion report that details the facts underlying the accomplice's crime. "°
The first area of judicial discretion is interpretation and application of the
Guidelines. A prosecutor may estimate a sentencing range, but thejudge ultimately
decides an accomplice's offense-level, criminal history category, and
adjustments.' Second, thejudge has discretion in choosing the particular sentence
within the sentencing range.'82 The difference between the upper and lower
sentences can be as little as six months or as great as six plus years." 3 Third, in
some limited circumstances, the judge may depart sua sponte from the
174. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6B1.4 (1998).
175. See Gardner & Rifkind, supra note 94, at 16.
176. In addition to the two roles listed, the court also plays a minor, insignificant role in grants of
formal immunity. See supra note 139.
177. See supra Part l.c.l.
178. See supra Part III.C.2.
179. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3 (1998).
180. See id. § 6AI.1.
181. See id. § 6A1.3(b) (stating that "[the court shall resolve disputed sentencing factors").
182. See id. § 5A.
183. See id.
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Guidelines.'" While some of these departures call for increases above the
Guideline range,' the downward departures are more frequently used byjudges.""
As noted before, the most common departure is the § 5K1 "substantial
assistance" departure, but the § 5K1 motion cannot be entertained by ajudge absent
a government motion, thereby making it the most valuable currency available to a
prosecutor." 7 However, the § 5K1 motion, if made, is subject to the broadest
judicial discretion. The Guidelines state that a judge may depart from the
sentencing range; judges have occasionally declined to decrease an accomplice's
sentence. 8 Furthermore, the Guidelines say nothing about how much a judge
should reduce a sentence, making .the terms of the leniency bribe contract even
more uncertain." 9
Notwithstanding these areas ofjudicial discretion, one should not overempha-
size the judge's power to regulate leniency bribes through sentencing. The
prosecutor, through his charging power, possesses considerable control over the
judge's sentencing decision."9 In a recent survey, nearly seventy-five percent of
federal judges polled believed that the prosecutor had the "greatest influence on the
final guideline sentence."'
9
'
2. Jury Instructions
When an accomplice testifies against his coconspirator, a federal trial judge
frequently cautions jurors about the unreliability of accomplice testimony."9
Although jury instructions do not diminish the value of a leniency bribe to the
testifying accomplice, they do provide a judicial means for regulating the
prosecutorial practice of offering leniency for testimony. A prosecutor must
184. See id. § 5K2.0 (permitting judge to depart from the Guidelines when "there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance... not adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing
commission"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
185. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0.
186. See United States Sentencing Commission Federal Sentencing Statistics, Federal Sentencing
Statistics by State, 1997 Fiscal Year, Table 8, at 11 (visited Feb. 11, 2000) located at
<http//www.ussc.gov.judpack/jp 1997.htm>.
187. See supra notes 112-15, 123-24 and accompanying text.
188. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1. 1 (1998); see, e.g., United States v. Luis, 102
F.3d 466, 468 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that a defendant was denied a "substantial assistance"
departure--despite the government's § 5KI motion--because the district court found the defendant
had received adequate leniency in a charge-bargain).
189. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5KI.I (1998); see, e.g., United States v. Manella,
86 F.3d 201,202 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the district court granted a seven-month departure after
government had requested a sixty-month departure); cf Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 126, at 20.
(discussing whether judges should be given more concrete guidance for sentencing outside the
Guidelines).
190. See Standen, supra note 119, at 1501-17.
191. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 126, at 15.
192. See 1 Edward J. Devitt et. al., Federal Jury Instructions: Civil and Criminal § 15.04, at
495-502 (4th ed. 1992).
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consider the likelihood and the content of any instructions before deciding to offer
a leniency bribe.
Courts have long recognized the danger of accomplice testimony.' In the late
1700's, judges began to caution jurors about the dangers of uncorroborated
accomplice testimony. Originally, such a caution was not a rule of law but merely
soundjudicial practice.'9 Today, over twenty Americanjurisdictions have codified
the judicial practice into a nondiscretionary rule of law, whereby judges must give
the instruction and juries are required to acquit if they find the accomplice's
testimony to be uncorroborated 95
The federal system has never adopted a similar rule of law. In Caminetti v.
United States,' the Supreme Court commented that "it [is] the better practice for
courts to caution juries against too much reliance upon the testimony of accompli-
ces and to require corroborating testimony before giving credence to such
evidence."'" Nevertheless, when the defendant argued that the trial judge should
have instructed the jury to disregard uncorroborated accomplice testimony, the
Supreme Court disagreed and held "there is no absolute rule of law preventing
convictions on the testimony of accomplices if juries believe them."' 98
Most of the courts of appeal have pattern instructions for cautioning jurors
about the dangers of accomplice testimony.'9 The following from the Eleventh
Circuit is fairly typical:
The testimony of some witnesses must be considered with more
caution than the testimony of other witnesses.
For example.... a witness who has been promised that he or she will
not be charged or prosecuted, or a witness who hopes to gain more
favorable treatment in his or her own case, may have a reason to make a
false statement because he wants to strike a good bargain with the
Government.
So, while a witness of that kind may be entirely truthful when
testifying, you should consider his testimony with more caution than the
testimony of other witnesses.'
Despite these standardized instructions, rarely does a failure to instruct result
in reversible error.2"' Generally, the trial judge commits reversible error only if he
fails to caution a jury about uncorroborated accomplice testimony.20 2
193. See 7 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2056, at 404-05 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
194. See id.
195. Seeid. §2056, at414&n.10.
196. 242 U.S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192 (1917).
197. Id. at 495, 37 S. Ct. at 198.
198. Id.
199. 1 Devitt et al., supra note 192, § 15.04, at 495-502.
200. Id. at § 15.04, at 502.
201. See id. § 15.04, at 495-502.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 848 F.2d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
McGinnis, 783 F.2d 755,758 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hill, 627 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (10th Cir.
200
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
D. Summary
Calculating the amount of currency available to a prosecutor involves a
number of steps. At a minimum, the prosecutor must figure the possible sentencing
range under the Guidelines, consult the limits of DOJ policy, and considerjudicial
intervention.2 3 All three-the Guidelines, DOJ policy, and the courts-regulate
a prosecutor's ability to offer leniency bribes. Nonetheless, critics contend that the
regulations are insufficient and that any testimony induced by a leniency bribe
should be excluded. 204
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
Opponents of leniency bribes have raised essentially two arguments in support
of a per se exclusion of leniency-induced testimony: (1) such testimony is
inherently unreliable and (2) it impairs judicial integrity.2 ' Neither of these
arguments merits exclusion, especially in light of the crime-fighting benefits
derived from leniency bribes. Leniency bribes do carry a small risk of erroneous
convictions, but this risk can be reduced through prosecutorial and judicial
safeguards without sacrificing the benefits of leniency bribes.
A. Policy Arguments for a Per Se Exclusion
1. Inherent Unreliability
The Singleton I panel justified its holding by stating that "the purpose of...
§ 201 [(c)(2)] is to keep testimony free of all influence so that its truthfulness is
protected."' One commentator has noted that" [a] ccomplice plea agreements tend
to produce unreliable testimony because they create an incentive for the accomplice
to shift blame to the defendant or other co-conspirators,"'2'c while another
commentator has asserted that "[a] promise of favorable treatment in exchange for
1980); Tillery v. United States, 411 F.2d 644, 646-47 (5thCir. 1969). But see United States v. Bernard,
625 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1980) (where the Ninth Circuit found reversible error when the accomplice
testimony was merely "important" and weakly supported by other evidence).
203. See supra Part II.A,B, & C.
204. See infra Part IV.A.
205. See id. The Singleton I panel also argued that "deterrence of official misconduct" was a
policyjustification for exclusion of leniency-induced testimony. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text. However, this argument presumes that offering a leniency bribe is "official misconduct." If one
concludes, as Singleton 11 did, that offering a leniency bribe is not official misconduct, then this policy
argument becomes moot.
206. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1350.
207. Yvette Beeman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under ContingentPleaAgreements, 72 Comell
L. Rev. 800, 802 (1987).
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'cooperative' testimony creates an incentive for perjury."' ° These critics contend
that testimony induced by leniency bribes is so inherently unreliable that it should
be excluded per se.
209
American jurisprudence, however, does not mandate exclusion of evidence just
because it is unreliable. Unless a specific rule forbids it, all relevant evidence is
admissible.210 The jury, not the judge, has the responsibility of evaluating the
weight of the evidence .2  Nonetheless, courts have recognized that some evidence
has "special dangers" of unreliability, and in recognition of these dangers, courts
have developed policies, called "probative policies" by Dean Wigmore, that lay
down "extra safeguard[s]."212 Perhaps opponents of leniency bribes could justify
their per se exclusionary rule as a necessary "safeguard" because leniency-induced
testimony poses a "special danger."
The most obvious such danger is that the leniency bribe makes the accomplice
a biased, interested witness. That danger can be combated without resorting to an
exclusionary rule. The early common law did prohibit interested parties from
testifying, but that policy has long been obsolete.2 " Today, when a witness is
interested, counsel on cross-examination is given broad scope to expose the
witness's biases, including the nature of any leniency bribe.2 4 Excluding biased
witnesses would be an extreme step backwards in the development of evidence law.
Critics of leniency bribes also often compare the unreliability of accomplice
testimony to the unreliability of hearsay and then argue that the similarities between
the two justify the exclusion of accomplice testimony.2 ' This reasoning is wholly
without merit. Hearsay is considered a "special danger" because the declarant is
not subject to cross-examination, the declarant is not under oath, and the
declarant' s credibility cannot be assessed and observed byjurors." 6 None of these
dangers exist with accomplice testimony.217
Commentators have also argued that since the Supreme Court has decided that
unreliable eyewitness identifications are excludable, ergo unreliable accomplice
testimony should be excluded.21 8  The analogy is unpersuasive. Pretrial
identification has "special dangers" because a witness may mistakenly become
convinced that the defendant was the perpetrator, due to overly-suggestive and
208. Samuel A. Perroni & Mona J. McNutt, Criminal Contingency Fee Agreements: How Fair
are They?, 16 U. Ark. Uttle Rock L.J. 211, 222 (1994).
209. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1359-61; Perroni &McNutt, supra note 208, at230-31; Beeman,
Note, supra note 207, at 806, 816.
210. 1 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 10, at 152 (2d ed. 1923).
211. See id. § 12, at 157.
212. See2Wigmore, supra note 210, § 1171, at711.
213. See 1 Wigmore, supra note 210, § 575, at 985.
214. See Edward J. lmwinkelried & Daniel D. Blinka, Criminal Evidentiary Foundations 184-85
(1997); 3A John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 944, at 778 n.1 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
215. See Perroni & McNutt, supra note 208, at 230.
216. See 5 Wigmore, supra note 193, § 1362, at 3-12.
217. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Beeman, supra note 207, at 805.
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untrustworthy police procedures that take place outside the courtroom.2"9 By the
time of trial, the eyewitness has become so persuaded of her previously faulty
identification that defense counsel cannot correct the mistake through a courtroom
cross- examination.22 To safeguard against such unreliable results, the Court has
mandated certain procedures-such as the presence of defense counsel at pre-trial
line-ups and regulation of suggestive techniques-to eliminate, in advance, the
untrustworthy elements of line-ups.22" ' In contrast, accomplice testimony is
unreliable due to witness bias, and as noted earlier, defense counsel can disclose
the biases to the jury on cross-examination. 2 So long as leniency bribes are fully
documented and made available to defense counsel, the out-of-court dangers of
leniency bribes can be corrected in the courtroom.
Another plausible rationale for exclusion might be what Dean Wigmore
deemed a "preferential rule."2" Sometimes, evidence is excluded, either absolutely
or conditionally, because other evidence is more reliable.' For example, the best
evidence rule is a conditional preference because original writings are preferred,
unless they are unavailable.2" One could argue that other forms of evidence (i.e.
circumstantial evidence or non-accomplice testimony) are preferred, either
absolutely or conditionally, over accomplice testimony. However, prosecutors are
often forced to use accomplice testimony because no other strong evidence is
available. Furthermore, prosecutors probably already do use non-accomplice
evidence whenever possible in order to maximize the chances of convicting a
defendant and to minimize the amount of a leniency bribe they must pay an
accomplice.226 In summary, leniency-induced testimony has no special dangers that
would merit its exclusion.
2. Judicial Integrity
The Singleton I panel and commentators have claimed that preservation of
judicial integrity merits per se exclusion of accomplice testimony induced by a
leniency bribe.227 Defining "judicial integrity" is no easy feat. The Supreme Court
has proclaimed that "[t]he primary meaning of 'judicial integrity' in the context of
evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the
Constitution.""22 Judicial integrity could also be extended to discourage statutory
219. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1936-37 (1967).
220. See id. 235-36, 87 S. Ct. at 1936-37.
221. See id. 236, 87 S. Ct. 1937.
222. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
223. See 2 Wigmore, supra note 210, § 1172. at 712.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See generally supra Part I. As the amount of non-accomplice evidence increases, the
bargaining power of the prosecutor over the accomplice also rises, enabling the prosecutor to offer a less
lucrative leniency bribe.
227. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1360; Perroni & McNutt, supra note 208, at 211; Beeman, supra
note 207. at 823-24.
228. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,458 n.35, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3034 n.35 (1976).
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violations; as Singleton I noted, courts should "not be made party to lawlessness
by permitting unhindered use of the fruits of illegality." However, these definitions
require that a law be broken, and if one accepts the notion that leniency bribes do
not violate § 201(c)(2) or any other law, then the "judicial integrity" argument
becomes moot.
Perhaps the "judicial integrity" argument is grounded in a belief that leniency
bribes are just not fair.2 29 Opponents of leniency bribes have noted that if a defense
attorney bribed a witness, he would be subject to disciplinary sanctions and
criminal penalties; meanwhile, his prosecutor-opponent can bribe with impunity.'
One court has commented that when a private attorney pays a fact witness, the
attorney "violates the very essence of the integrity of the judicial system";;"
therefore, critics contend a prosecutor's leniency bribe must be equally ominous for
judicial integrity.23 2 Mr. J. Richard Johnston, the attorney who devised the
§ 201(c)(2) argument made in Singleton I, best summarizes this view of "judicial
integrity":
Regardless of the difference in the duties of a prosecutor and defense
counsel, compensating a witness for testifying involves an identical threat
to the integrity of the judicial system whether the witness testifies for the
prosecution or the defense. There is no apparent reason why the rules233
should be different for the two sides in a criminal case....
The reasoning of Mr. Johnston and other critics is flawed because it fails to
acknowledge a key distinction between illicit bribes and leniency bribes. When a
criminal defendant bribes a witness, it is done covertly and without the judge, the
prosecutor, and, most importantly, the jury ever knowing anything about the nature
of the bribe. An illicit bribe is often totally obscured from the finder of fact,
depriving the jury of valuable evidence that could assist it in evaluating the
credibility of the bribed witness.
In contrast, a leniency bribe is heavily regulated, well documented, and made
known to the court, to defense counsel, and, again most importantly, to the jury.'
As noted before, a defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the accomplice.
Just like any other witness, the credibility of an accomplice testimony is subject to
attack and impeachment. Defense counsel is free to admit into evidence the
229. See Perroni & McNutt, supra note 208, at 220-22; Beeman, supra note 207, at 826.
230. See Mark Hansen, Shotdown in Mid-Theory, A.B.A. J. May 1999, at 46; J. Richard Johnston,
Paying the Witness: Why is it OK for the Prosecution, but not the Defense?, 11 Crim. Just. 21, 23
(Winter 1997).
231. The Florida Bar v. Jackson, 490 So. 2d 935, 936 (Fla. 1986).
232. See Johnston supra note 230, at 24; Perroni & McNutt, supra note 208, at 222.
233. Johnston, supra note 230, at 24; see generally Hansen, supra note 230, at 46. Rather than
arguing that neither prosecutors nor defense counsel should be permitted to make any type of bribe,
Singleton I supporters might want to argue that both prosecutors and defense counsel should be
permitted to make leniency bribes. See generally Rita W. Gordon, Comment, Right to Immunity for
Defense Witnesses, 20 Conn. L. Rev. 153 (1987). Such a proposal is beyond the scope of this Article,
but it could achieve the fairness desired by defense attorneys.
234. See supra Part M; supra notes 135, 217 and accompanying text.
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accomplice's plea agreement or immunity deal; furthermore, counsel may argue to
the jury that the accomplice is lying to save his skin. In the leniency bribe scenario,
the jury is presented with all the evidence so it can determine the credibility of the
accomplice-witness. None of these procedures occur with an illicit bribe. A
leniency bribe does not corrode the judicial process like an illicit bribe does,
because the procedures that accompany a leniency bribe ensure that judicial
factfinding is not impaired.
B. Benefits and Costs of Leniency Bribes
The primary benefits of leniency bribes are obvious: they elicit testimony that
assists in the prosecution and conviction of factually guilty defendants.
Unfortunately, there are no firm statistics showing how many persons are convicted
based upon accomplice testimony. One survey loosely supports the argument that
leniency-induced testimony is helpful in obtaining convictions. The U.S.
Sentencing Commission examined 130 drug defendants who had provided the
government some type of substantial assistance (e.g. testimony, undercover work,
nontestimonial information, etc.).23 Of these 130, twenty-nine testified for
prosecutors.236 The study does not indicate how many convictions directly resulted
from the testimony provided by the twenty-nine accomplices, but the study did
show that the assistance provided by all 130 accomplices resulted in twenty-one
trial convictions and fifty-eight guilty pleas.237
Other evidence indicates that leniency bribes are most critical in the war on
drugs. In 1997, over thirty-four percent of all § 5K1 "substantial assistance"
departures were granted to defendants convicted of drug trafficking or
possession-more than any other crime category.' Furthermore, studies show that
prosecutors use the § 5K1 departure to lure "small fish" drug operators to catch
"big fish" drug leaders and organizers.239 Judge Trott of the Ninth Circuit, an
ex-prosecutor, has explained why accomplice testimony is so necessary to catch the
"big fish":
[H]uman nature is such that if you go to somebody who's been trapped,
a small fish, and say, "We'd like you to testify against your boss," and he
says, "Well, what do I get out of it," and you tell him, "Nothing," then
235. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 126, at 28. The types of assistance categorized in the
survey were: (1) undercover, (2) testimony, (3) agreement to testify, (4) information on new co-
defendants, (5) information on known defendants, and (6) information on own criminal conduct.
236. See id. Seventeen performed undercover work, thirty-two agreed to testify, twenty-five gave
information on new co-defendants, seventy-eight provided information on known defendants, and seven
provided information on their own criminal conduct.
237. See id. at 29. Some of the other results were thirty-one new prosecutions and five sentencing
enhancements.
238. See United States Sentencing Commission Federal Sentencing Information, Federal
Sentencing Statistics by State, 1997 Fiscal Year, Table 9, at 14 located at <http//www.uisc.gov.
judpack/jpl997.htm>. Many of these departures may have been granted for non-testimonial assistance.
239. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 126, at 12-13.
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why is he going to cooperate? So I think it's important to be able to give
something in return.'
Additionally, since Singleton I, law enforcement officials have stressed the
significance of leniency bribes to crime-fighting. The DOJ announced that "[tihe
department relies on [accomplice] witness testimony in thousands of cases each
year," and if Singleton I had been upheld, it "would [have] cripple[d] enforcement
of federal criminal and civil law."24' One former prosecutor commented that "[t]he
prosecutions where the government does not use informants are few and far
between."242 Furthermore, current prosecutors believe accomplice testimony is
beneficial. In a recent survey of eighty-eight U.S. Attorney's offices, testimony at
trial was the only type of assistance for which all eighty-eight offices would grant
a § 5K1 departure to an accomplice. 3 One writer claims that in the last five years,
the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York has solved 250
gang-related murders and convicted 300 persons on almost exclusively accomplice
testimony.244 Other writers have described how the § 5K1 departure was critical
to law enforcement's efforts in toppling a notoriously violent Chicago street
gang.24 Although much of the foregoing evidence is anecdotal and inconclusive,
it generally indicates that leniency bribes benefit prosecutors and police in their
crime-fighting efforts.
Nevertheless, leniency bribes are not cost-free. One cost is that factually guilty
accomplices receive lower sentences, thereby causing great sentencing disparities
amongst defendants who have committed similar crimes.' Victims and society are
often morally outraged that a criminal is getting a "break." While such outrage may
be understandable, a number of factors should dampen this outrage. First, a
prosecutor may often be unsure of whether she has sufficient admissible evidence
to convict an accomplice at trial; the leniency bribe entices the accomplice to plead
guilty, thereby avoiding the risk of the accomplice receiving a "not guilty" verdict
and no punishment at all. Second, an accomplice who does cooperate with the
government should probably be considered less morally culpable and more
deserving of a lower sentence than a non-cooperating defendant. Third, an
accomplice who testifies against a defendant possibly runs the risks of reprisal
240. Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 17, 1998), available in 1998 WL
3309399.
241. See id.
242. Fimea, supra note 3 (comments of Mr. Tom Crowe of Crowe & Scott, Phoenix, Arizona).
243. See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 126, at 26.
244. See Steven M. Cohen, "Singleton" Turns the Tables Too Far, 21 Nat'l L. Nov. 16,1998,
at A27.
245. See Safer & Crowl, supra note 124, at 41-42.
246. See Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Defending Substantial Assistance: An Old Prosecutor's
Meditation on Singleton, Sealed Cases, and the Mayfield-Kramer Report, 12 Fed. Sent. R. 45, 46-47
(1999); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 Buff. L Rev. 563, 564 (1999). The
problem of sentencing disparity should not be underestimated, and this Article, admittedly, does not
sufficiently address the problem. Professors Bowman and Weinstein have offered some interesting
suggestions to correct sentencing disparity.
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from the defendant or his confederates; 247 a leniency bribe compensates the
accomplice for the risk he takes.
Another cost to society of leniency bribes is the risk that an accomplice will
fabricate testimony, thereby misleading a jury and causing a wrongful conviction
of an innocent defendant. Calculating this risk is exceedingly difficult if not
impossible. A recent example of the costs incurred by this risk occurred in Illinois,
where state prosecutors allegedly used a leniency bribe to coerce a witness to
falsely implicate defendants in a double murder case, resulting in four innocent
persons spending eighteen years in prison. 8 One can certainly imagine situations
where a leniency bribe might encourage an accomplice to implicate innocent
confederates for self-serving purposes.' 9 Professors Bedau and Radelet claimed
in one study, which has been discredited by some scholars," ° that out of 360
erroneous capital convictions this century, twenty-two were caused by prosecutors
and police who unduly influenced key witnesses, some of whom received leniency
bribes.2'
Nonetheless, even if one accepts the figures from the Bedau and Radelet study,
the vast majority of wrongful convictions are not the result of leniency-induced
testimony. 52 While the newspapers recently have been filled with stories of
wrongful convictions, leniency bribes have not been the primary cause of these
convictions." Rather, other factors, such as mistaken eyewitness testimony, seem
to be largely responsible for wrongful convictions.254 Even though there may be
247. See Safer & Crowl, supra note 124, at 42.
248. See, e.g., Abdon M. Pallasch, 'Ford Heights Four' Case Now Turns on Prosecutors, Police,
Chicago Daily L Bull.. Apr. 24, 1999, at 3 (alleging that a key eyewitness changed her testimony and
placed the defendants at the scene of the crime only after prosecutors agreed to reduce the eyewitness's
sentence for a perjury conviction to probation); see also Ken Armstrong, Now Ford Heights 4 Seek
Special Prosecutor, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 1, 1999, at I (Metro), available in 1999 WL 2859249.
249. Cf., e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police Investigation 133-
34 (2d ed. 1998) (detailing U.S. Postal Service sting operation where police informants-who were paid
for their services-wrongly implicated innocent persons with apparent motive of "scamming" money
from the federal government).
250. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 121 (1988).
251. See Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages in Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 Stan. L Rev. 21, 56-57, 58-59 (1987).
252. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Sharen Cohen, Last-Minute Exonerations Fuel Death-Penalty Debate Justice. Los
Angeles Times, Aug. 15, 1999, at Al; Shirley E. Perlman, Exoneration by DNA Raises Unsettling
Questions, Indianapolis Star, Aug. 1, 1999, at A7; David Protess & Rob Warden, Nine Lives: The
Justice System Sentenced These Men to Death, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 10, 1997 (Magazine), available
at 1997 WL 3576969.
254. See Perlman, supra note 253 (noting Department of Justice study that found eyewitness
testimony was incriminating factor in 28 cases of wrongfully-convicted persons); Michael Higgins,
Tough Luckfor the Innocent Man, 85 A.B.A. J. 46,48 (Mar. 1999) (quoting ProfessorC. Ronald Huff,
co-author of a book about wrongful convictions as saying "[t]here are just a lot of problems with
overreliance on eyewitness testimony"). The homepage of the Innocence Project, a group at Cardozo
School of Law that attempts to exonerate innocent death row inmates, claims that "[clonventional
serology, mistaken eyewitness identification, and unmonitored laboratory practices have contributed
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some legitimate reasons to believe that leniency bribes cause innocent persons to
be convicted, the evidence for this proposition is too light to justify an outright ban
on leniency bribes; a more appropriate step would be greater regulation of leniency
bribes through safeguards.
C. Some Proposed Safeguards
The Singleton I panel and leniency bribe opponents'urged exclusion of
leniency-induced testimony in order to safeguard against the risk of perjury.' s This
safeguard, however, is too costly to society. As explained above, leniency bribes
benefit society by enabling prosecutors to more effectively combat crime. 6
Furthermore, the art of cross-examination permits a defendant, just like any other
litigant, to expose an accomplice's bias and lack of credibility. Nonetheless, three
aspects of leniency-induced testimony suggest that extra safeguards are warranted.
First, society has higher expectations of government litigants than private litigants;
therefore, government prosecutors should be expected to be more careful than
private litigants in ensuring that their witnesses are reliable. Second, while an illicit
bribe is probably within the cormnon understanding of jurors, a leniency bribe is
unique to the criminal law world and may be difficult for jurors to comprehend;
hence, jurors may need extra assistance in understanding the leniency bribe. Third,
unlike civil litigation, a criminal trial involves a person's liberty interest; thus, the
law should require extra safeguards in criminal litigation. I propose two
safeguards. First, DOJ should develop more thorough procedures for confirming
the reliability of accomplice witnesses.57 Second, judges should be required as
matter of law to give a cautionary instruction to the jury about the dangers of
leniency-induced testimony. 8 All of these safeguards can reduce the risk of
erroneous convictions while not depriving society of the benefits of leniency
bribes.
1. Formal Prosecutorial Procedures
As previously noted, the U.S. Attorney's Manual and other DOJ resources
provide extensive guidance to prosecutors on the procedures for offering leniency
bribes.29 However, the U.S. Attorney's Manual lacks an expressed procedure for
determining the reliability of accomplice testimony. The proposed procedure is
simple: Before a prosecutor puts an accomplice witness on the stand, one or more
disinterested officials should review the case file and verify that the accomplice's
testimony has indicia of reliability.
largely to the population of thousands to be unjustly incarcerated." Innocence Project at Cardozo
School of Law (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <httpJ/www.cardozo.yu.edu/innocence.projectlindex.html>.
255. See supra Part W.A.
256. See supra Part IV.B.
257. See infra Part IV.C.l.
258. See infra Part WV.C.2.
259. See supra Part m.B.
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Prosecutors who have been intimately involved with a case may be incapable
of adequately assessing the reliability of an accomplice-witness, because
prosecutors, like all litigating attorneys, often become passionate advocates for
their position. A disinterested official could ensure that the prosecutor's reliability
assessment is correct. The disinterested official should be an experienced attorney
with no stake in the outcome of the case. Small U.S. Attorney's offices may need
to consult other offices or hire outside counsel for large cases. If the disinterested
official opined that the accomplice was unreliable, her opinion would not
necessarily halt the prosecution, but it should provoke further review of the case
by more senior officials.
In her review, the disinterested official should look for evidence, either direct
or circumstantial, that corroborates the accomplice's testimony. Corroborating
evidence normally will provide sufficient indicia of reliability. In the absence of
corroborating evidence, the disinterested official should scrutinize the case for any
special reasons that would make the accomplice particularly reliable; for example,
perhaps the accomplice has clearly demonstrated great remorse for past crimes.
When an accomplice has a high motive to lie (e.g. avoidance of a lengthy sentence),
the disinterested official should be particularly suspicious of the accomplice's
reliability.
Although many U.S. Attorney's offices may already have local formal or
informal procedures for verifying accomplice testimony,2" one study has indicated
that many U.S. Attorney offices do not comply with their local § 5K1
procedures, 6 and obviously, an unenforced policy will not reduce the risk of
wrongful convictions. DOJ should formulate a general policy for all U.S. Attorneys
and include it as part of the U.S. Attorney's Manual. Formal written procedures
promulgated by DOJ will make all U.S. Attorneys and their prosecutors
accountable for adhering to the policy.
2. Cautionary Jury Instructions
As noted before, giving cautionary jury instructions for leniency-induced
testimony has always been considered sound judicial practice, but appellate courts
refuse to find reversible error for a failure to instruct, unless there is a lack of
corroborating evidence.262 This deference to the trial court's discretion is
unnecessary, for it is difficult to imagine a case where an instruction would not be
beneficial. Appellate courts should find that failure to give a cautionary instruction
is plain error, even if corroborating evidence exists.263
260. Cf. Daniel C. Richman, The Challenges of investigating Section 5KI.) in Practice, 11 Fed.
Sent. R. 75 (1998) (noting different procedures among different districts).
261. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 196, 201-02 and accompanying text.
263. Overwhelming corroborating evidence may mean that the lack of an instruction is merely
"harmless error."
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The present pattern instructions used in the various circuits are adequate. 2'
The instruction should expressly say what a witness is receiving or may receive in
the future for his testimony. The Ninth Circuit's instruction is exemplary: "You
have heard the testimony from ... a witness who has received immunity. The
testimony was given in exchange for a promise by the government .... 
Some may argue that an additional jury instruction is unwarranted, because an
instruction discussing general witness biases is sufficient.2" However, jurors may
have difficulty understanding exactly what the accomplice-witness is receiving in
exchange for his testimony. Expert witnesses often testify when something is
beyond the jury's normal understanding,267 but calling expert witnesses to explain
leniency bribes would be time-consuming and costly. In contrast, ajury instruction
costs society almost nothing, and it may reduce the risk of wrongful conviction by
educating jurors about the accomplice's leniency bribe. Furthermore, a judicial
instruction comports with ajudge's role of giving "reasonable guidance to the jury
on the facts of the case. 268
Cautionary instructions are subject to valid criticisms. Whether jurors pay
attention to jury instructions is a debatable issue, and lengthening an instruction
might only lessen jurors' attention to the instruction. Nevertheless, a concise and
express statement by the judge can avert these problems and still assist the jury in
understanding the nature of the accomplice's leniency bribe.
V. CONCLUSION
Singleton I, although wrongly decided, has sparked a healthy debate about
prosecutorial offers of leniency in exchange for accomplice testimony.269 Such
offers can be characterized as bribes, and the currency used in these bribes is
leniency.270 The amount of currency available to a prosecutor is regulated by the
Sentencing Guidelines, DOJ policy, and the courts.2  These regulations, coupled
with the art of cross-examination, expose the unreliable elements of accomplice
testimony and ensure that judicial integrity is not impaired; therefore, exclusion of
leniency-induced testimony is unwarranted.272 Leniency bribes benefit society by
aiding in crime-fighting, but they cause a small risk of wrongful convictions.273 To
reduce this risk at little cost, the Justice Department should adopt formal
procedures to verify the reliability of accomplice testimony, and trial judges should
give cautionary instructions to juries about the nature of leniency bribes.274
264. See, e.g., supra note 199-200 and accompanying text.
265. See 1 Devitt et al., supra note 192, § 15.03, at 493.
266. See, e.g., 7 Wigmore, supra note 193, § 2057, at 417-20.
267. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702.
268. See I Devitt et al., supra note 192, § 7.01, at 200.
269. See supra Part II.
270. See supra Part M.
271. See id.
272. See supra Part IV.A.
273. See supra Part IV.B.
274. See supra Part IV.C.
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